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When Your Rival Becomes Your
Dance Partner: Mary Carter Agreements in

Missouri Courts
Newman v. FordMotor Co.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Mary Carter agreements 2 occur when a plaintiff asserting liability against
joint tortfeasors 3 enters into a settlement agreement with less than all of the
defendants. The settling defendant, who remains a party at trial, obtains the
possibility of offsetting her financial exposure depending on how much money
the plaintiff recovers from the other defendants. These agreements pose a
potential threat to the adversarial nature of the trial process. This threat is
especially severe when the trier of fact is not apprised of the agreement.4
Although maintaining the adversarial character of judicial proceedings is
a public policy deserving of protection, 5 the ability of a plaintiff to control the
tenor of her lawsuit also merits judicial consideration.6 Mary Carter agreements
implicate both of these public policies in ways that require trial courts to
administer actions with procedural safeguards. However, these safeguards must

1. 975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1998).
2. The term "Mary Carter agreement" is derived from the Florida case Booth v.
Mary CarterPaintCo., 202 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See generally Pat
Shockley, The Use OfMary CarterAgreements In Illinois, 18 S. Ill. U. L.J. 223, 225
(1993); Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Validity And Effect Of "MaryCarter" Or Similar
Agreement SettingMaximum Liability OfOne CotortfeasorAnd ProvidingFor Reduction
Or Extinguishment ThereofRelative To Recovery Against NonagreeingCotortfeasor,22

A.L.R.5th 483, 497 (1995); Part III. A. and accompanying text infra.
3. See Beare v. Yarbrough, 941 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining
that ajoint tortfeasor is an actor who has acted independently but concurrently with one
or more other actors in causing harm to a person, which harm is incapable of division,
and for which harm each actor is a substantial factor of causation) (citing Costello v.
Ellisville, 921 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); McDowell v. Kawasaki Motors
Corp., 799 S.W.2d 854, 861-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Brickner v. Normandy Osteopathic
Hosp., 687 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
4. See generally John E. Benedict, It's A Mistake.To Tolerate The Mary Carter
Agreement, 87 COLuM L. REv. 368, 368-82 (1987). Benedict states that Mary Carter

agreements should never be tolerated because they distort "tort litigation by prejudicing
non-settling defendants at trial, undermining the equitable apportionment of damages
among tortfeasors, and contravening legal ethics." Id. at 368.
5. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 175-76 (Mo. 1993) (citing
Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452,457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
6. Id. (finding that these public policies can coexist even when a Mary Carter
agreement is used, as long as the non-settling defendant is not deceived).
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be selected and applied with caution so as to not impinge on another public
policy, that of affording all of the parties a fair trial.'
In Newman v. FordMotor Co.,8 the Missouri Supreme Court identified the
particular features of Mary Carter agreements which, when present, warrant
specified remedial measures.9 The court reasoned that because of the competing
public policies implicated by these agreements, and because of the potential for
almost limitless possibilities in structuring them,'" noperse rule will afford trial
courts the flexibility necessary to cope with one of these agreements and obtain
a fair result.
Therefore, the court reiterated the existing approach in Missouri that the
existence of a Mary Carter agreement must generally be disclosed to the jury, but
not when doing so would be unfair to the settling defendant, which must be
determined on a case-by-case basis." Although the Newman court did not
articulate a new rule, or identify explicit exceptions to the existing rule, the court
did clarify and expand existing law. This treatment was necessary given that the
court below was adjudicating the issues presented by the Mary Carter agreement

with a general rule that was overruled in 1993.2
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1993, Deborah Newman was severely injured and became a paraplegic
when the Ford Aerostar she was driving was impacted from behind by a
dumptruck.'3 The dumptruck was carrying gravel and weighed approximately
53,000 pounds.' 4 The impact caused the Aerostar to instantly accelerate from a
standstill to approximately thirty miles per hour, whereupon it struck another

7. Id. See generally Part III. C. and accompanying text infra.
8. 975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1998).
9. Id. at 150. See generallyPart III. C. and accompanying text infra.
10. See generally Part III. A. and accompanying text infra.
11. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. 1998); see infra Part
III. B. and accompanying text.
12. See Newman v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 20573, 20560, 1997 WL 778512, at *4
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1997) (concluding that the existence of a Mary Carter agreement
should generally not be disclosed to the jury). The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Southern District of Missouri in Newman was relying on a rule articulated by the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri in Hackman v.
Dandamudi,733 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The Hackman rule of general
nondisclosure of Mary Carter agreements was overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court
in Carterv.Tom's TruckRepair,Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Mo. 1993) (citing Ratterree
v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063, 1074 (Kan. 1985)).
13. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Mo. 1998).
14. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 20573, 20560, 1997 WL 778512, at *1 (Mo.
Ct.
App. Dec. 19, 1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
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vehicle that was stopped in front of the Newmans.' 5 The driver's seat in the
Aerostar was designed and produced with a weak point, causing the seat frame
to collapse backward upon impact.1 6 When the Aerostar's seat collapsed, Ms.
Newman was injured after she was propelled backward into the seat behind
her. 17 The Newmans brought suit in the Circuit Court of Greene County,
Missouri against the dumptruck owner CBS Redi-Mix Inc. (CBS) and driver
McCoy 8for negligence, and against Ford Motor Company (Ford) for defective
design.'

Before trial, the Newmans agreed to limit satisfaction of any judgment
against CBS and McCoy (hereinafter CBS defendants) 9 exclusively to the policy

limits of CBS's liability insurance, with no guarantee of recovering anything

from them.20 In return, the CBS defendants agreed not to appeal any unfavorable
judgment, to remain in the suit, and to employ counsel not affiliated with their
insurance company.2' Ford and the trial court were aware of the agreement, but,
after a hearing, and over the objections of Ford, the trial court ruled against
disclosing the terms of the agreement to the jury.22
After a jury verdict in favor of the Newmans, Ford appealed to the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri.23 Ford contended on
appeal that the agreement was a Mary Carter agreement, and that the trial court's

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Newman, 975 S.W.2d at 149. Mr. Newman's claim was for loss of consortium.
Newman, 1997 WL 778512, at *1. A jury verdict was entered in favor of the Newmans,
with damages assessed at $12.5 million. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147,
149 (Mo. 1998). Fault was apportioned among the plaintiff and defendants; 70% to CBS

and McCoy, 25% to Ford, and the remaining 5%to the Newmans. On appeal, the fault
allocated to the Newmans was re-allocated proportionally between Ford and the CBS
defendants because the court found that the trial court erred in giving a comparative
negligence instruction premised upon Section 307.178 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
The statute requires most front seat occupants of passenger vehicles to wear seatbelts, but

limits the extent to which failure to wear a seatbelt is admissible as evidence of
comparative negligence against an injured motorist. MO. REV. STAT. § 307.178.3 (1994).

Ms. Newman was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident. Newman, 975
S.W.2d at 154. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed as modified, with the
Newmans' fault reapportioned to the defendants. Id. at 155.
19. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 20573, 20560, 1997 WL 778512, at *2(Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1997). CBS and McCoy were covered by the same insurance policy.
20. Newman, 975 S.W.2d at 149. After the CBS defendants had settled with seven
other claimants involved in the accident, $468,432.98 remained under the policy.
Newman, 1997 WL 778512, at *2.
21. Newman, 975 S.W.2d at 149.
22. Newman, 1997 WL 778512, at *3-4.
at* 1. of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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refusal to disclose its terms to the jury constituted reversible error.2 4 The court,
without explicitly finding that the agreement was a Mary Carter agreement,
concluded that Ford was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to disclose the
agreement's existence to the jury.' The court explained that the general rule is
to not disclose Mary Carter agreements to the jury,26 but the decision whether to
disclose must be made on a case-by-case basis, at the trial court's discretion.27
The court ruled that Ford did not meet the burden of showing that the trial court
had abused its discretion.28
The cause was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1998.29 There,
Ford argued that a Mary Carter agreement exists whenever a settling defendant
remains at trial, and that such agreements must always be disclosed to the jury."
The Supreme Court held that when: (1) a settlement agreement between a
plaintiff and less than all of the co-defendants is not kept secret from the trial
court; (2) the plaintiffs are not guaranteed a minimum recovery from the settling
defendants; and (3) any judgment against the settling defendants is not to be
offset by the amount recovered against any non-settling defendant, the
agreement is not a "typical" 3' Mary Carter agreement. 32 The court further held
that the trial court will not abuse its discretion in declining to disclose the
existence of such agreements to the jury.33

-24. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 20573, 20560, 1997 WL 778512, at *4 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1997).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452,458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri relied on the rule
articulated by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri in
Hackrnan v. Dandamudi,733 S.W.2d 452,458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The Haclanan rule
as articulated by the Southern District is that "[ijn the absence of compelling reasons to
disclose the existence of [a Mary Carter agreement] such agreements should generally
not be admissible." Newman, 1997 WL 778512, at *4.This rule was overruled by the
Missouri Supreme Court in 1993. See supra note 13.
27. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 20573,20560, 1997 WL 778512, at *4 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1997) (citing Montgomery v. Clubb, 907 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995)). In Montgomery, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri explained that whether a particular Mary Carter agreement will be allowed
should be determined on a case by case basis. Montgomery, 907 S.W.2d at 175. The
Montgomery court did not discuss the issue of whether or when the existence of a Mary
Carter agreement should be disclosed to the jury. Id. at 175. However, the Montgomery
court did discuss the trial court's discretion in regard to the admissibility of evidence in
general. Id. at 176.
28. Newman, 1997 WL 778512, at *5.
29. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1998).
30. Id. at 150.
31. See infra note 35.

32. Newman, 975 S.W.2d at 150.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
33. Id. at 151.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Characteristicsof Mary CarterAgreements
Mary Carter agreements occur when a plaintiff asserting liability against
joint tortfeasors enters into a settlement agreement with less than all of the

defendants.34 The typical features 35of Mary Carter agreements are: (1) the

plaintiff is guaranteed a minimum recovery; (2) the settling defendant remains
a party at trial and is limited to a maximum liability which may be offset by a
specific recovery against the non-settling defendant; and (3) the existence or
terms of the agreement are not fully disclosed to the jury, judge, or non-settling
parties, absent a court order.
Almost twenty years after the Florida case which put the phrase "Mary

Carter Agreement" into the judicial vernacular, 36 a Missouri appellate court, in

Hackman v. Dandamudi,37 first discussed the characteristics of these settlement
devices.3a In Hackman, the plaintiff was a patient at a nursing home, where she
developed gangrene necessitating amputation of her leg above the knee.39 The
co-defendants were the nursing home and the plaintiff's attending physician.40
A Mary Carter agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the nursing
home.4' The agreement provided for the plaintiff to receive $100,000 in

34. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8,10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
In Booth, the case from which the term "Mary Carter agreement" was coined, the plaintiff

brought a wrongful death action (the plaintiff's wife had been killed in a car accident)
against five defendants. Id. at 9. Before trial, the plaintiff entered into a settlement
agreement with two of the defendants. Id. The agreement limited the liability of the
settling defendants to $12,500, and guaranteed the plaintiff a minimum recovery of that
amount. Id. at 10. The agreement further provided that if a verdict was entered against
the non-settling defendants exceeding $37,500, the settling defendants would not
contribute anything. Id. The agreement also stipulated that the settling defendants would
remain in the lawsuit as active defendants, and that the existence of the agreement would
not be revealed to the jury, nor the contents of the agreement to the judge, absent a court
order. Id. at 11. The court upheld the validity of the agreement. Id. at 8-11.
35. Although the enumerated features are asserted as typical of Mary Carter
agreements, see Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo. 1993),
the agreements are also said to be of potential infinite variety, with the features limited
only by the imaginations of the counsel shaping them. For this proposition see Maule
Ind., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) and Carter,where

the Missouri Supreme Court recognized that Mary Carter agreements can appear in an
"unlimited variety of contractual arrangements." Carter,857 S.W.2d at 176.

36. Booth, 202 So. 2d at 10.
37. 733 S.W.2d 452, 455-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
38. Id. at454.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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installments from the settling defendant.42 If recovery against the settling
defendant exceeded the agreed upon amount, the plaintiff was to execute on the
excess only against the settling defendant's insurer, which was in liquidation."
The agreement provided that any judgment rendered against the non-settling
defendant, up to the amount of the settlement, was to offset the amount that the
settling defendant would be required to pay.'
The court characterized the agreement as a combination of a loan receipt
agreement, and the type of agreement authorized by Missouri's contribution
between tortfeasors statute.45 A loan receipt agreement allows a plaintiff to
receive money from the settling defendant, which must be repaid only if the
plaintiff receives a judgment against the settling defendant." This can be
advantageous to a plaintiff who might otherwise not have the financial
wherewithal to proceed with an action.47
Of particular interest in Hackman is the fact that the settling defendant's
liability was not actually limited by the agreement. Rather, any judgment in
excess of the agreed amount was to be executed only against the settling
defendant's insurance company, not the settling defendant. 48 Because the
insurance company was in liquidation at the time the parties entered into the
agreement, the practical effect of the agreement was to limit the settling
defendant's liability, without expressly doing so.49
The court concluded that the parties had "in effect" entered into a Mary
Carter agreement," and that the agreement was not admissible to show that a
settlement had been reached, but would be admissible if necessary to show
witness bias. 51 According to the court, the non-settling defendant simply did not
articulate any acceptable purpose justifying disclosure of the agreement; 2 thus,

42. Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452,454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 456. The statute allows a plaintiff to agree to release, not sue, or not
enforce a judgment against "one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same
injury[,]" if the agreement is entered into in good faith. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060
(1994).
46. Haclanan, 733 S.W.2d at 456.
47. See Grillo v. Burke's Paint Co., 551 P.2d 449, 452 (Or. 1976) (explaining that
loan receipt agreements may be beneficial in that they encourage out of court settlements,
and help injured plaintiffs solve financial problems brought about by delays in the court
system). But see Benedict, supra note 4, at 368-82 (arguing that the plaintiff often must
wait until after trial to receive funds from the settling defendant, and that contingency fee
arrangements with counsel serve the same purpose without settlement).
48. Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).

49. Id. at456.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 458. Acceptable purposes, justifying admission of the existence of a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
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the trial
court did not err in keeping the existence of the agreement from the
53
jury.
The Missouri Supreme Court first discussed the use and attributes of Mary
Carter agreements in Carterv. Tom's Truck Repair,Inc. 54 There, the plaintiff
entered into an agreement with one of two defendants, whereby the plaintiff was
guaranteed a minimum recovery and the settling defendant was guaranteed a
maximum liability of $250,000, to be offset dollar for dollar by any judgment
against the non-settling defendant.5 The settling defendant also agreed to
remain a party at trial and not to appeal any judgment. 6 The existence and terms
of the agreement were made known to the non-settling defendant prior to trial,
and the amount of the settlement was made known to the non-settling defendant
on the first day of trial.57
In addition, during cross-examination of the settling defendant's witnesses,
the court informed the jury of the existence and basic terms of the agreement.58
The court stated that of the typical features of Mary Carter agreements, the
element of secrecy, coupled with the settling defendant's interest in increasing
the plaintiff's recovery against the non-settling defendant, threatens "distort[ing]
the adversarial process and potentially undermin[ing] the right to a fair trial. 59
In Carter,the "worst feature" 6 of Mary Carter agreements, "deception of the
tribunal," 61 was not present.

B. ProprietyofMary CarterAgreements
In Hackman v. Dandamudi,62 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District of Missouri recognized that Mary Carter agreements implicate the
competing public policy considerations of allowing plaintiffs to control the tenor
of their lawsuits and of ensuring that the existence of a secret agreement does not

Mary Carter agreement, would include not revealing to the non-settling defendant the fact
that the settling defendant has a financial stake in increasing the plaintiffs recovery
against the non-settling defendant. Id.
53. Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452,458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
54. 857 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo. 1993).
55. Id. at 174. The plaintiff was in his vehicle, stopped at a red light, when he was
impacted from behind by the settling defendant's truck. Id. The driver of the truck
asserted that the truck's brakes failed; the non-settling defendant was the company
responsible for repairing and maintaining the brakes. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 1993).
60. Id.
61. Id.
S.W.2dof
452,456-57
(Mo. Ct.
Published62.
by 733
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perpetrate a fraud on parties not privy to the agreement.63 The Missouri Supreme
Court, appreciating the tension created by Mary Carter agreements on these
public policy considerations, held, in Carterv. Tom's Truck Repair,Inc.,6 that
the proper judicial treatment of such agreements requires examining them on a
case-by-case basis, rather than outrightly forbidding their use.65
The same year that Carterwas decided in Missouri, the Florida Supreme
Court6 held that Florida state courts will no longer allow plaintiffs to enter into
Mary Carter agreements or agreements of any kind which call for the settling
defendant to remain at trial.67 The court indicated that Mary Carter agreements,
although conducive to settlement with one defendant, actually promote litigation
rather than settlement.68 Because the settling defendant may ultimately pay
nothing to the plaintiff, depending on the amount of money for which the nonsettling defendant is found liable, there is a strong incentive for the settling
defendant to increase the recovery against the non-settling defendant.69 This
incentive promotes unethical behavior on the part of counsel because in
"maintain[ing] the charade of an adversarial relationship ..... the attorneys
representing the settling parties will be tempted to make misrepresentations to
the court.7°

63. Id. at 457.
64. 857 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 1993).
65. Id.
66. The state which decided the case from which the phrase "Mary Carter
agreement" is derived. See supra note 34.
67. Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 1993).
68. Id. at 245. The settling defendant may retain veto power over the plaintiffs
ability to settle with other defendants, thereby acting as an impediment to complete
settlement. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 244-245. See also Lum v. Stinnet, 488 P.2d 347, 350 (Nev. 1971). The
Nevada Supreme Court in Lum characterized the agreement between the plaintiff and two
of three co-defendants as champerty and maintenance. Id. The agreement called for the
plaintiff to receive a guaranteed sum from the settling defendants, bringing recovery up
to $20,000 in the event of a jury award less than that amount, in exchange for not
contesting the settling defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and for not settling with
the remaining defendant without the consent of the settling defendants. Id. The court
reasoned that the settling defendants, by virtue of the trial court's grant of their motion
for a directed verdict, were not parties to the action, and so were meddling in the suit
between the plaintiff and the non-settling defendant without any interest in the action.
Id. This, the court said, is maintenance. Id. The court also characterized the agreement
as champerty in that the settling defendants stood to profit from the suit, to the extent that
the plaintiffs recovery against the non-settling defendant would offset the settling
defendants' liability. Id. See also Elbaor v. Smith 845 S.W.2d 240, 249 (Tex. 1992)
(stating that Mary Carter agreements "present to the jury a sham of adversity between the
plaintiff and one codefendant" and that "[t]he Mary Carter agreement is simply an unwise
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
and
champertous device").
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Missouri is aligned with the vast majority of jurisdictions that do not
prohibit Mary Carter agreements. 7' Missouri does recognize, however, that these
agreements, depending on a particular settlement's characteristics, effect, and
factual setting, do present dangers that trial courts must contend with on a caseby-case basis.72

C. ProceduralSafeguards to Reduce the PotentialRisks ofMary
CarterAgreements
The particular features of Mary Carter agreements identified by the Carter
court as posing a threat to a fair trial are: (1) the settling defendant's pecuniary
stake in increasing the amount of money any non-settling defendant becomes
responsible for at trial, and (2) the secret nature of such agreements." The court
has identified a number of procedural safeguards a trial court may employ to
minimize the dangers of unfairness and "distort[ion] of the adversarial process"74
created by these features.
When the above-mentioned features are present in a Mary Carter
agreement, and the non-settling defendant moves for disclosure of the existence
and basic terms of the agreement to the jury, the trial court should make such
disclosure unless doing so would cause "substantial danger of undue prejudice
'
or confusion."75
Disclosure should not include the amount of the settlement, or
refer to insurance coverage, and the jury should be instructed not to consider the
agreement in assessing any party's liability.76

71. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 1993). See also

J. Michael Phillips, Looking Out ForMary Carter: Collusive Settlement Agreements In
Washington Tort Litigation,69 WASH. L. REv. 255, 259 (1994).
72. Carter,857 S.W.2d at 176.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 178 (citing Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063, 1074-76 (Kan. 1985)).
In Ratterree, the Kansas Supreme Court held that where a party to a Mary Carter
agreement is a witness at trial the existence and general terms of the agreement shall be
disclosed to the jury, unless the court finds in its discretion that disclosure would confuse
the issues, mislead the jury, or create a "substantial danger of undue prejudice."
Ratterree,707 P.2d at 1076. The amount of the settlement is never to be disclosed to the
jury, but the settling defendant's financial interest in the outcome of the case shall be
made known in general terms. Id. The Ratterree court cites to a California statute that
requires, in all cases, the disclosure of the existence of Mary Carter agreements to the
court and other parties. Id. at 1075 (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.5(b) (West
1980)). The Cartercourt held that the trial court's failure to allow disclosure of the
agreement during the non-settling defendant's opening statement was an abuse of
discretion, but any prejudice resulting was insufficient to warrant reversal because the
jury eventually was made aware of the existence of the agreement. Carter,857 S.W.2d
at 179.
76. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Mo. 1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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In addition to disclosing the existence of the agreement, a trial court may
reallocate peremptory strikes.77 Under the Missouri Revised Statutes, in Section
494.480.1, each party in a civil action is entitled to three peremptory challenges
of jurors.78 When there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, each group is
treated as if there were only one plaintiff or defendant.79 A trial court has
discretion to distribute these challenges among a respective group of plaintiffs
or defendants.80 Because a Mary Carter agreement may unite the settling
defendant with the plaintiff in attempting to maximize the amount of money
recovered against the non-settling defendant, the trial court may allocate all of
the "defendant" peremptory strikes to the non-settling defendant.8
In Carter,' the non-settling defendant sought to have the settling defendant
either realigned as a plaintiff at trial or dismissed from the action altogether.83
The court held that formal realignment of the settling defendant as a plaintiff
could promote confusion regarding the interests of the parties." Furthermore,
where co-defendants have filed cross-claims to apportion fault against each
other, an adversarial relationship exists between them, regardless of whether one
of them has reached a settlement agreement with the plaintiff." Therefore,
neither the formal realignment nor the dismissal sought by the non-settling
defendant was warranted.86
However, the Cartercourt recognized that some type of realignment (other
than calling the settling defendant a plaintiff at trial) can and should be achieved
in some fashion.87 Reallocation of peremptory strikes is one possible means of
achieving realignment.88 Informal realignment may also be reached by making
the jury aware of the settling defendant's financial interest in the plaintiffs
recovery against the non-settling defendant,8 gor by prohibiting the settling
defendant from involvement in the issue of damages at trial.9" The trial court in

77. Id. at 177.
78. Mo. REv. STAT. § 494.480.1 (1994).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Mo. 1993). The trial

court's failure to reallocate peremptory challenges was not shown to be clearly
prejudicial to the non-settling defendant. Id. at 178.
82. Carter,857 S.W.2d at 176.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 177.
85. Id

86. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Mo. 1993). But see
Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that

non-settling defendant is entitled to separate trial).
87. Carter,857 S.W.2d at 177.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
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Carter achieved informal realignment by allowing the non-settling defendant
twice as much time as the settling defendant to present a closing argument.9 1
In Carter, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized that Mary Carter
agreements serve favorable purposes in allowing plaintiffs to control the tenor
of their lawsuit and choose to settle as they see fit.92 The court also recognized
that such agreements threaten unfairness to the non-settling defendant and can
distort the adversarial process.93 Because of the risks presented by Mary Carter
agreements, trial courts must exercise discretion in taking remedial measures to
guard against such risks. 4
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Newman v. FordMotor Co.,95 the Missouri Supreme Court noted that
after Carter, Missouri courts are adjudicating with a rule that mandates
disclosure of Mary Carter agreements to the jury, unless there has been a finding
that disclosure would be unduly prejudicial.96
The Newman court identified the settling defendant's interest in increasing
the amount the plaintiff recovers against any non-settling defendant as a feature
of Mary Carter agreements threatening to undermine the adversary process, and
thus mandating disclosure under Carter.97 This feature was not present in the
agreement between the Newmans and the CBS defendants. 9 However, the court
also indicated that any agreement that calls for a party to hide an interest from
the jury at trial may constitute undue prejudice.99
The court stated that because the trial court was aware of the agreement,
and because the Newmans were not guaranteed a minimum recovery, and
because the CBS defendants were not able to offset any judgment obtained
against them, the agreement did not mandate disclosure to the jury."
Furthermore, the court indicated that because the agreement did not release the
CBS defendants from liability, and because the Newmans did not receive any

91. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Mo. 1993).
92. Id. at 176.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 176-80.
95. 975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1998).
96. Id. at 150.
97. Id. The danger is that the settling defendant will inflate the plaintiff's damages,
in order to reduce its exposure. Id. See Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d
172, 178 (Mo. 1993) (asserting that "the worst feature" of Mary Carter agreements is

"deception of the tribunal").
98. Newman, 975 S.W.2d at 150.
99. Id.
100. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo. 1998). The court
noted that the CBS defendants actually had an interest in making sure that the total
amountby
ofUniversity
damages remained
as small
as possible.
Id.
Published
of Missouri
School
of Law Scholarship
Repository, 1999
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payment, there was very little of the agreement which could have been disclosed
without creating undue prejudice to the CBS defendants.' 0
The court recognized that settlement agreements whereby the parties remain
at trial can be of almost unlimited variety. 0 2 Because of this potential for
variation, no bright-line rule adaptable to the facts of every particular agreement
can be articulated.'0 3 What must be accomplished at trial is a balance between
the goal of maintaining the adversarial nature of the action and the goal of
encouraging settlements, in part by protecting the settling parties from the
dangers inherent in disclosure of their agreement.' 4 The trial court is entrusted
with the responsibility of exercising discretion in an effort to maintain the
integrity of the adversarial process.0 5
The Newman court concluded that because the trial court postponed ruling
on Ford's motion to disclose the agreement, allotted Ford two of the three
defendants' peremptory strikes, and allowed Ford to argue after the CBS
defendants during closing arguments, adequate precautions had been taken to
preserve the adversarial nature of the proceeding." Therefore, the trial court0 7did
not abuse its discretion in declining to disclose the agreement to the jury.1
V. COMMENT
The Newman court reiterated the "mandatory disclosure" rule articulated by
the Cartercourt in 1993,0' and then indicated that there is noper se rule." The
court seemingly articulated a rule, and then refused to enforce it. A rule should
not be labeled "mandatory" if it is not. The apparent inconsistency of the court's
assertions is resolved when one reads the CarterandNewman decisions in light
of the particular features of the settlement agreement between the Newmans and
the CBS defendants, and in light of the public policy considerations the court
sought to preserve."0

101. Id. at 151. See Carter,857 S.W.2d at 178 (identifying references in a Mary
Carter agreement to the amount of settlement and the existence of insurance coverage as
information which would be prejudicial to the settling defendant).
102. Newman, 975 S.W.2d at 151.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. 1998). The court
mentioned that the surest way to prevent the ills threatened by Mary Carter agreements
is to disclose their existence to the jury. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (referring to "Carter'smandatory disclosure rule").

109. Id. (acknowledging that when the agreement gives the settling defendant a
direct financial interest in the plaintiff's recovery against the non-settling defendant,
disclosure is "generally" mandated).
110. See Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
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First, it is helpful to appreciate that the settlement agreement in Newman did
not contain the features Missouri courts have said are typical of Mary Carter
agreements."' The Newmans were not guaranteed a minimum recovery;". the
CBS defendants were not necessarily going to pay any damages;" 3 no amount
recovered from Ford was to offset the CBS defendants' financial exposure;,"
and the terms and existence of the agreement were not kept secret from Ford or
the trial court." 5 Although the court did not explicitly say so, this settlement
agreement was not a Mary Carter agreement as defined by Missouri courts.
Therefore, the general rule pertaining to the disclosure of settlement agreements
to the jury, not the Carter"mandatory disclosure" rule, seems applicable." 6 The
mere fact that a settling defendant remains a party at trial is not sufficient to
create the potential problems
Missouri courts have identified as flowing from
7
Mary Carter agreements."
Second, assuming arguendothat the agreement between the Newmans and
the CBS defendants was a Mary Carter agreement, the court's treatment of the
issues presented is fair and comports with the approach taken by the vast
majority of jurisdictions."' Rather than disallow plaintiffs the opportunity to
settle with defendants as they see fit, the court will allow them to enter into

(explaining that "[t]here is a strong public policy against allowing secret agreements to
work a fraud .... However, there are also strong public policy considerations in favor
of allowing plaintiffs to control their own cases and settle with defendants as they
choose.").

111. See Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo. 1993).
In Carter,the court identified the typical features of Mary Carter agreements as:
1) The liability of the settling defendant is limited, and the plaintiff is
guaranteed a minimum recovery; 2) The settling defendant remains a
party to the pending action without disclosing the full agreement to the

non-settling parties and/or the judge and jury, absent court order; and 3)
If judgment against the non-settling defendant is for more than the
amount of settlement, any money collected will first offset the
settlement so that the settling defendant may ultimately pay nothing.

Id. (citing Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452,455 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
112. Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo. 1998).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 149 (explaining that "the general rule is that evidence of settlement
agreements is not admissible, absent a clear and cogent reason, because they tend to be
highly prejudicial").
117. See Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo. 1998) (identifying
distortion of the adversarial process and undermining of the right to a fair trial as the
dangers threatened by Mary Carter agreements).
118. See Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 1993).
For example, the tendency of settling defendants to engage in collusive behavior with the
plaintiff in increasing the plaintiff's recovery against any non-settling defendant.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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settlement agreements that potentially threaten the adversarial nature of the trial
process, with the caveat that the existence and basic terms of the agreement must
be disclosed to the jury, unless doing so would unduly prejudice the settling
defendant.
Even though the agreement in Newman was not a Mary Carter agreement,
the court's clarification of the Cartermandatory disclosure rule was needed.
The court below was relying on a rule that had been overturned by Carterfive
years prior." 9 One potential problem is that Newman gives little guidance to
parties as to what will qualify as a Mary Carter agreement, thus triggering
mandatory disclosure of their settlement agreement to the other parties, the court,
and the jury. However, to date, no non-settling defendant has won reversal on
appeal by arguing that the trial court
erred in not disclosing the existence of a
120
Mary Carter agreement to the jury.

What the Newman court failed to do is specify which remedial measures
(reallocation of peremptory strikes, alteration of the order of closing arguments,
prohibition of the settling defendant from participating in the damages hearing,
or disclosure to the jury) would be proper when one or more of the features of
Mary Carter agreements (for example, the settling defendant remaining a party
at trial, or the settling defendant maintaining a financial interest in the amount
the plaintiff recovers against any non-settling defendant) are present in a

119. See Newman v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 20573, 20560, 1997 WL 778512, at *4
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1997). The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District
of Missouri concluded that the existence of a Mary Carter agreement should generally
not be disclosed to the jury. The Southern District in Newman was relying on a rule
articulated by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri in
Hackman v. Dandamudi,733 S.W.2d 452,458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The Hackman rule

of general nondisclosure of Mary Carter agreements was overruled by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Carterv. Tom's Truck Repair,Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Mo. 1993)

(citing Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063, 1074 (Kan. 1985)).
120. See e.g., Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. 1998)
(holding no prejudice to the non-settling defendant by the trial court's refusal to disclose
the existence of the settlement agreement to the jury where the settling defendant did not
retain a financial interest in the plaintiffs recovery against the non-settling defendant,
and the trial court allotted two of three peremptory strikes to the non-settling defendant);
Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 179 (Mo. 1993) (holding that the
trial court's failure to disclose the existence of the Mary Carter agreement to the jury
during opening argument was an abuse of discretion, but the non-settling defendant was
not sufficiently prejudiced to mandate reversal where the jury eventually was apprised
of the existence of the agreement); Hackman v. Dandamudi, 733 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Mary Carter agreements should not be disclosed to the jury
because settlement agreements generally are highly prejudicial); see also King v. Copp
Trucking Inc., 853 S.W.2d 304, 306 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the features of
Mary Carter agreements although the trial court's treatment of the agreement was not an
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/4
issue
on appeal).
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settlement agreement. Trial courts and parties would benefit from some further
clarification.

VI. CONCLUSION
After Newman's clarification of Carter'smandatory disclosure rule, parties
contemplating entering into a Mary Carter agreement should be aware of the
likelihood that the existence and basic terms of the agreement will be disclosed
to the jury at trial. If the parties desire to avoid disclosure, they should structure
the agreement so that the settling defendant's financial responsibility to the

plaintiff isnot tied to any recovery against the non-settling defendant. Such a
financial interest on the part of a settling defendant will virtually guarantee that
the jury will be apprised of the fact that seeming rivals are really dance partners.
However, the absence of such an interest will not guarantee that the jury will be
kept in the dark about the existence of the agreement. The Newman court could
have, but did not, give some assurance that Mary Carter agreements can be
structured so as to necessarily avoid the Cartermandatory disclosure rule.
THOMAS G. PIRMANTGEN
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